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The budgetary slack is a common figure in any public sectors, however, 
as the excess of requirements for resources or understatement of 
productive capability, the difference of those magnitudes indicates the 
disability of government officials to take into account all chances and 
risks in the future. This paper aims at analyzing the variance of 
expenditure in the case of Jakarta province over the period of 2004-
2007. Based on the statistical analysis, the study reveals that there are 
significantly budgetary slacks. In context of entrepreneurship, the 
improvement of the entrepreneurial spirit in the public sector is 
necessary to minimize budgetary slack. 
 




Budgetary institutions and the budgetary process fulfill several important functions. These 
include setting priorities in the allocation of public resources; planning to achieve policy 
goals; establishing financial control over inputs to ensure compliance with rules; managing 
operations with fiscal prudence, efficiency, and integrity; and ensuring accountability to 
taxpayers. The effectiveness of budgetary institutions has been recognized in the 
economics and political science literature as contributing to improved fiscal and economic 
outcomes. In developing countries, like in Southeast Asian, budgetary processes and 
institutions are not yet well enough developed to perform the above-mentioned functions 
adequately; instead, they provide work as means of legalistic controls (Shah, 2007). This 
condition also triggers the common pool problem of public finances, in which politicians 
spend money drawn from a general tax fund on public policies targeted at individual 
groups in society, leads to excessive levels of public spending. Putting the argument into a 
dynamic context, one can show that it also leads to excessive deficits and government 
debts (see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti, 2004; Abdullah, 2004; Velasco, 2000; von Hagen 
and Harden, 1995). 
 
Related to the dynamics of excessive of public spending or excessive deficit, it is 
interesting to explore deeper the consequences of this difference between budget and its 
realization, or budgetary slack, especially in public service sector. Hopwood (1972) argued 
that the existence of ‗budgetary slack‘ could be viewed as possibly a bad thing and it 
potentially diminished the quality of comparing actual performance to budgeted data, as it 
created inefficiency and wastage (Yuen, 2004). However, ‗budgetary slack‘ could also be 
viewed as possibly a good thing in that it can increase flexibility when managers are 
presented with unexpected potential opportunities (Marginson, 1999; Marginson & Ogden, 
2005; Samma, 2009).  
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In regarding to budgetary slack management, the focus of earlier researches was on the 
private sector (Merchant, 1985; Dunk and Perera, 1997; Marginson, 1999; Otley and 
Pollanen, 2000; Van der Stede, 2001). Despite the efforts of two decades of public sector 
reforms whereby the public and private sectors became quite similar, there still remained a 
characteristic difference. The public sector maintained a richer culture than the private 
sector through the nature of government ownership and the focus of its culture on public 
interest. Therefore, in their seminal work, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) asserted that 
government should fundamentally transform their systems and organizations to 
dramatically increase their effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability, and capacity to innovate, 
or in other words, to be having more entrepreneurial spirit in managing the people. 
 
To measure the effectiveness local government in managing and providing public services 
to people in context of entrepreneurial spirit, this paper tries to see the relation between 
budgetary slack and government entrepreneurial spirit, by analyzing the tendency of 
realized public spending (expenditure budget) and its gap to fulfill the objectives of budget, 
which has been determined before. A budget is a financial plan to control future operations 
and results. It is expressed in numbers, such as dollars, units, pounds, hours, manpower, 
and so on. It is needed to operate effectively and efficiently. Budgeting, when used 
effectively, is a technique resulting in systematic, productive management. Therefore, 
effective budgeting, whether is in planning or execution, reflects effective entrepreneurial 
spirit. 
 
This paper is organized in the following manner. First, background on budgetary slack is 
provided, including the basic concept of government‘s entrepreneurial spirit, new public 
management, and new public service that underline the need to reform traditional 
budgeting approach towards NPM budgeting approach. Research hypotheses are then 
proposed regarding the presence of budgetary slack in Jakarta province public 
expenditure budget for the period 2004-2007. The methodology and model, including 
discussion of sampling frame and measures, are then discussed. The slack of inter-
semester expenditure budget is then analyzed, and the results of two ways ANOVA test of 
budget slacks are provided. Finally, implications for budgetary slack and government 
entrepreneurial spirit, and future research on public management related to 
entrepreneurial-budget approach are presented. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Budgeting, in public sector administration field, has been described as being ‗at the core of 
the financial process within a local authority‘ (Hale and Capaldi, 2003). Public sector 
budgeting is a complicated process. However, in practice, Public sector budget would be 
informed to the public for criticism and discussion to get input. It is an instrument of 
accountability for the public funds management and control of programs implementation, 
which are funded by public money (Mardiasmo, 2002). In practice, the changes on the pre-
set budget plan are commonly done (Henrika and Mardiasmo, 2002). These changes are 
one of the causes of budgetary slack. 
 
The ability to estimate that will happen in the future becomes an important consideration in 
preparing the budget. It requires internal and external situation should be under control 
and accommodated properly. The ability to see far ahead of this kind of situation will 
determine the accuracy of the budget and its realization. The difference between the 
budget and the realization (budgetary slack), therefore, will be an indicator of "success" in 
preparing the budget. 
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From the behavioral perspective, the existence of the budget gap or budgetary slack is an 
indication of the lack or weakness of the public sector‘s entrepreneurial spirit. Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992) argued that entrepreneurial government should learn to measure the 
outcomes for what they spend. It refers to J. B. Say‘s definition on entrepreneur that ―shifts 
economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and 
greater yield‖ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In other words, it uses resources in new ways 
to maximize productivity and effectiveness. Accountability must shift from inputs, such as 
line items, to outcomes and results. In a broader scale, budgetary slack carries the 
consequences of inefficiency for all parties (Stiglitz, 1988). 
 
Government‘s entrepreneurial spirit means that there must be a transformation from the 
bureaucratic governance model toward the entrepreneurship one, when public sources are 
becoming rare. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) proposed 10 principles to create 
government‘s entrepreneurial spirit: 
 
1. Steer rather than row to get catalytic government. 
2. Empower rather than serve to get community-owned government. 
3. Inject competition into service delivery to get competitive government. 
4. Transform rule-driven organizations to get mission-driven government. 
5. Fund outcomes, not inputs, to get results-oriented government. 
6. Meet the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy, to get customer-driven 
government. 
7. Earn rather than spend to get enterprising government. 
8. Prevent rather than cure to get anticipatory government. 
9. Move from hierarchy to participation and teamwork to get decentralized government. 
10. Leverage change through the market to get market-oriented government. 
 
Those principles are intended to be a road map for any government institution and leader 
who seeks more effective programs and policies. They are intended to create 
entrepreneurial government, which are catalytic, competitive, mission driven, results 
oriented, customer driven, and enterprising. Decentralization means empowering 
employees, pushing decisions down from one level of government to another. Community-
owned government pushes control out of bureaucracy and into the community. 
Anticipatory government stresses prevention rather than cure. Finally, market-driven 
government explores the idea of changing markets rather than always using public 
programs to solve problems. 
 
Previous studies, which had been done in developed countries, such as Rubin (1987), 
Sutter and Wilson (1990), Staple and Rubin (1997), and Dougherty et al. (2003), revealed 
that budgetary slack was related to politic or economic phenomena, which was considered 
as the source of fiscal stress cause. They concluded that external factors, which were out 
of local government‘s control, played important role in determining the amount of 
budgetary slack.  
 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979), for example, argued that the difference in the local budget 
was the result of an imbalance of power between society and bureaucrats in public 
decision making. They called it as reversion level, which was based on direct voting 
against government spending on goods and certain public services. According to Romer 
and Rosenthal (1979), with its information superiority, bureaucrats would be able to 
influence the outcome of the majority of public decision making through agenda control. 
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This bureaucratic model, which produced big budget gap or budgetary slack, had long 
been criticized (Cooper, 1998; Hughes, 1994). Some paradigms emerged as a challenger, 
such as the NPM (New Public Management) or reinventing government and more recently 
NPS (New Public Service) (Denhart and Denhart, 2003). Both paradigms were based on 
experiences in America, Australia, New Zealand in recent decades (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992). Based on these paradigms, the government was encouraged to be more flexible in 
setting goals and clear organizational targets, thus it allowed measuring the results.  
 
According to the idea of NPM and NPS, the government is also expected to conduct 
decentralized and market-oriented policies, which is also to involve the private sectors in 
formulating and implementing the policies (Hood, 1995). In addition, the NPM idea is also 
seen as an attempt to use the private sector and business approaches to determine the 
public service sector‘s policies (Denhart and Denhart, 2003). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
argued that there should be a transformation from a bureaucratic model toward a 
entrepreneurship model, which was derived from recent situation that many governments 
were facing a serious problem, i.e. public resources were increasingly scarce. 
 
This entrepreneurial government paradigm required that public service budgeting should 
also changed from traditional approach, which stressed on line-item and incrementalism 
method and mainly based on the amount of prior budget realization, toward NPM 
approach, which based on results or performance achievement. It would change from 
centralized, specified, yearly based, and gross-oriented budgeting principles into 
performance-based budgeting, which reflected the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
services or the public interest oriented budgeting. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Traditional Budgeting Approach and NPM Budgeting 
Approach 
 
Traditional Budgeting Approach NPM Budgeting Approach 
Centralized  Decentralized & devolved management  
Input oriented Input, output and outcome (value for money) oriented 
Not related to long-term planning  Comprehensive and related to long-term planning 
Line-item and incrementalism  Based on goals and target 
Rigid department Cross department 
Using classical tactics:  
Vote accounting  
Zero-Based Budgeting, Planning Programming 
Budgeting System  
Gross budgeting principles  Systematic and rational 
Yearly based budgeting Bottom-up budgeting  
Source: Mardiasmo (2002) 
 
Regional Budget or Local Government Revenues and Expenditures are the main policy 
instrument for local government. As a policy instrument, budget occupies a central position 
in developing the capability and effectiveness of local government. In NPM approach, 
there are five pillars in formulating, implementing, and auditing the local government 
budgeting, i.e. accountability, value for money, probity, transparency, and control. 
Accountability is the principle of public accountability, which means that the budgeting 
process from the planning, preparation and implementation should actually be reported 
and accountable to parliament and the public. Value for money means the values of 
economic, efficiency, and effectiveness are applied in the budgeting process. Probity 
means local government officers must have high integrity and honesty, so the 
opportunities for corruption can be minimized. Transparency is the openness of 
government in making local financial policies so it can be known and monitored by the 
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parliament and the public. Control means any variances (differences) of revenues and 
expenditures in government local budget must be analyzed and investigated immediately 
in order to find the possible causes of variances and take anticipated actions in the future. 
 
Prior studies in Indonesia revealed that local wisdom and philosophy were good to be the 
guideline in budgeting formulation (Suryani, 2004). The budget‘s goals characteristics also 
significantly influenced on attitude and behavior of government local staff (Munawar, 2006; 
Rahayu, Ludigdo, and Affandy, 2007). Falikhatun (2007) argued that budgetary slack in 
Indonesian non government organizations was determined by information assymetry and 
group cohesiveness. However, these prior studies were viewed as case-based 
phenomenon, qualitative analysis, and micro coverage in explaining the obstacles of 
budgeting preparation that leads to budgetary slack and its conclusions could not be 
generalized. On the other side, some empirical studies used positivist approaches to 
analyze the budgetary slack in Indonesia. These studies focused on budgeting variation, 
more quantitative-based analysis, and macro coverage, therefore, its conclusions could be 
more generalized (Halim, 2001). In his study, Halim (2001) found that government policy, 
such as Indonesian Goverment Act No. 18/1997 on local tax and levy, had created the 
volatility in the local government revenue, which in turn brought uncertainty on the budget 
amount that could be spent. This revenue uncertainty had caused a greater possibility of 
revenue and expenditure shifting from its previously planned targets. 
 
These prior studies demonstrated several important points. First, the causes of budget 
variances were considered as exogenous, such as changes in economic conditions, 
political, and central government policy. Secondly, the magnitude of budget variances 
varied depending on local economic capacity to respond those exogenous changes. 
Thirdly, the amount of budget variance was highly correlated with the performance of local 
government finance. Therefore, it was possible to study deeper the budgetary slack in 
context of evaluating the Indonesian entrepreneurial government paradigm. To our best 
knowledge, this possibility is never studied in any prior studies that investigate the 
relationship between budgetary slack and government public policy, especially related to 
the test of government policy consistency towards its campaigned programs. By providing 
new empirical findings of budgetary slacks practices in public expenditure budget, we 
strive to explore the government behavior on its policies‘ implementation and provide a 
new base for better public management. 
 
This paper is different from previous studies in some aspects. First, it evaluates the 
Special Province of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, which is known as the richest 
province in Indonesia. The budget variation analysis of Jakarta province will provide a 
comparable study with other similar provinces or regions. Secondly, the time-period study 
is 2004-2007, which is considered as the most stable period in Indonesia during the last 
decade and is known as the least economic and politic changes period. Finally, it analyzes 
the semiannual and inter-account budget variance. Therefore, the analysis of budget 
variance will more focus on internal factors. 
                                          
4. Methodology and Model  
 
To analyse the slack of inter-semester expenditure budget, it is used a paired mean 
difference that is used when comparing two sets of measurements to assess whether their 
population means differ. The study will also use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to evaluate 
the amount of inter-semester and inter-account budgetary slack. It is used to investigate 
whether there is mean difference among three or more population groups. In this study is 
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used two ways ANOVA, because it will analyse two factors (inter-semester and inter-
account budget). 
 
Variance analysis is the squared differences of values and its averages, which could be 
derived from the differences of total average and column or row average. First variance is 
sum of square total (SST). Second variances are sum of square columns (SSC) and sum 
of square rows (SSR). To get SST, the differences of each values and its total mean value 
(μt) are squared.  
 
SST = Σ [Xi –μt]
2   ..... (1) 
 
To get SSC, the differences of each column values and its mean on that column (μc) and 
the same logic is applied to get SSR. 
 
SSC = Σ [Xi – μc]
2 ; SSR = Σ [Xi – μr]
2    ..... (2) 
 
Therefore, sum of square error (SEE) is the rest of two variances gotten.  
 
SSE = SST – SSC – SSR   ..... (3) 
 
Each variance values must be corrected by its degree of freedom. SST values are divided 
by N-1, SSC values are divided by C-1, and SSR values are divided by R-1, and SSE 
values are divided by [(C-1)x(R-1)]. In this stage, ANOVA is run by comparing column and 
row variances to undefined variances: 
 
                           SSC/(C–1)                SSR/(R–1) 
F-statistic (1) =  ------------------------ ;  F-statistic (2) = ------------------------   ..... (4) 
        SSE / [(C-1)(R-1)]        SSE / [(C-1)(R-1)] 
 
N = number of data; C = number of columns; R = number of rows 
 
Those statistical methods are applied to Semi Annual Budget Report during 2004-2007 
periods, with focus to the budgetary slack of direct and indirect expenditures accounts. 
The direct expenditure accounts consist of 14 item, which are grouped into three accounts 
and indirect expenditure accounts consist of 75 items, which are grouped into eight 
accounts (see Table 2). This grouping follows the Ministry of Internal Affairs Decree No. 
13/2006 that regulates public expenditures accounts for province, regency, and municipal 
budget and fiscal report. The decree itself was a product of new public management 
program that is intended to simplify the number of government financial accounts and 
harmonize it with the up-to-date best practices of public expenditure management. By 
adopting this new decree, this study will produce better model of public policy analysis that 
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Table 2: Direct and Indirect Expenditure Accounts  
 
No. Direct Expenditure Account No. Indirect Expenditure Accounts 
1 Local Staff Expenditure 1 Local Staff Expenditure 
2 Goods and Service Expenditure 2 Interest Expenditure 
3 Capital Expenditure 3 Subsidy Expenditure 
 4 Grant Expenditure 
5 Social Support Expenditure 
6 Profit Sharing Expenditure 
7 Financial Assistance Expenditure 
8 Unpredictable Cost Expenditure 
Source: Appendix A.VIII Ministry of Internal Affairs Decree No. 13/2006, 15 May 2006 
 
The budgetary slack is presented in relative form, because it is more realistic if we want to 





 ×100    ..... (5) 
 
Based on this formula, the accuracy of budget variance is indicated by a score of 100. If 
the budget realization were less than what has been targeted before, the variance score 
would be indicated less than 100. Meanwhile, if the budget realization exceeds the 
budgeted figures, the variance score will be more than 100. Therefore, this study just uses 
data of the realization of expenditure accounts, which have been budgeted. If there is 
realization on expenditure accounts but this is not budgeted previously, it will not be 
included in the analysis.  
 
In this study, we used the Special Province of Jakarta‘s Semi Annual Budget due to its 
characteristics, such as one of the rich provinces in Indonesia, which it could represent the 
population, i.e. Indonesian rich provinces, and be compared for further study purpose. 
Meanwhile, we used the time period of 2004-2007 based on the observation results that 
considered the period as the most stable one in Indonesia during the last decade, 
supported by conducive democratic environment, and was also known as the least 
economic and politic changes period. The government of Special Province of Jakarta also 
provided us the most updated and completed data needed, compared with other similar 




This study also applied two concepts; first, it referred to the pure budget (definition A). 
Second concept referred to dynamic revised budget (definition B). In Table 3, according to 
definition A, for the last four years, mean difference of direct expenditure budget was a 
significant decreasing. Generally, mean difference of direct expenditure budget reached 
107 percent. It meant in one year averagely the targeted budget could meet the realization 
more than seven percent. A different pattern happened to definition B, which revealed 
more realistic realization of direct expenditure than the targeted budget. The pattern of 
direct expenditure was closer to the figures that had been determined before or in other 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Direct Expenditure Budget Variance 
Special Province of Jakarta (2004-2007) 
 
Budget Variance Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Definition A Mean 102.21 113.76 112.05 103.45 107.8675 
 Max 208.36 195.12 492.65 220.92  
 Min 8.36 19.70 9.22 5.14 
 Median 81.08 119.19 94.76 106.38 
 Standard Deviation 66.51 58.19 95.57 62.84 
Definition B Mean 97.57 113.14 96.91 103.45 102.7675 
 Max 178.67 195.12 197.59 220.92  
 Min 6.57 24.75 2.51 5.14 
 Median 81.08 119.19 94.76 106.38 
 Standard Deviation 62.66 57.10 62.22 62.84 
Source: Government of Special Province of Jakarta 
 
Mean difference of expenditure budget for the dynamic revised budget was smaller than 
the pure budget one. It revealed that the amount of budgetary slack was relatively smaller 
after having revised in the dynamic revised budget than budgetary slack in the pure 
budget. Logically, this situation happened because the revision was done after taking 
consideration on certain changes in implementation phase; therefore, budgetary slack 
became smaller. 
 
In Table 4, mean difference of indirect expenditure budget revealed the same pattern, i.e. 
a decreasing trend. Compared to direct expenditure budget, the differences between 
indirect expenditure budget and its realization were more variety. It was shown by its 
maximum values and standard deviations that were bigger than direct expenditure budget. 
Based on this descriptive statistics, it guides us to intuitively conclusion that variability of 
budgetary slacks is potentially happened in the amount of indirect expenditure budget 
relatively than in the direct one. Did this happen coincidently or deliberately? To answer it, 
this paper did t-test for inter-semester budget and inter-accounts budget.   
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Indirect Expenditure Budget Variance 
Special Province of Jakarta (2004-2007) 
 
Budget Variance Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Definition A Mean 82.15 84.66 72.22 50.48 72.3775 
 Max 210.84 906.05 182.93 190.26  
 Min 0.80 2.05 0.53 0.56 
 Median 82.14 70.51 58.29 26.94 
 Standard Deviation 68.70 88.51 53.77 53.91 
Definition B Mean 80.38 77.61 70.84 50.15 69.745 
 Max 199.24 183.85 182.93 190.26  
 Min 0.79 0.89 0.30 0.33 
 Median 79.18 77.76 59.20 26.76 
 Standard Deviation 66.99 54.61 52.77 53.88 
Source: Government of Special Province of Jakarta 
 
In Table 5, it revealed the result of paired mean differences test for inter-semester direct 
budget during the last four years. The study found that the slacks between targeted budget 
and realization of direct expenditure budget were significantly different in each semester. 
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Table 5 : Summary of Paired Mean Difference Test of Inter-Semester Budget 






2004 2005 2006 2007 
Definition A t-statistics 16.9780 17.1740 4.4690 9.2727 
Definition B t-statistics 22.8085 19.3746 12.4393 9.2727 
     *t-table (5%; 26) = 2.379 (one-tail) 
   
Table 6 also showed that the result of paired mean differences test for inter-
semester indirect budget during the last four years. The study found that the slacks 
between targeted budget and realization of indirect expenditure budget were significantly 
different in each semester. The t-statistics value is bigger than the t-table with confidence 
level 5%, i.e. 1.96.  
 
Table 6 : Summary of Paired Mean Difference Test of Inter-Semester Budget 






2004 2005 2006 2007 
Definition A t-statistics 38.4128 9.9302 33.8744 13.9028 
Definition B t-statistics 40.6857 46.3426 34.9555 13.7004 
*t-table (5%; 148) = 2.264 (one-tail) 
 
The empirical findings uncovered that the realization level for both categories of 
expenditures was not the same at the first and second semester (inter-semester). Budget 
realization tended to overcome the target at the second semester in each year. It meant 
that there was less integration between planning and budgeting in context of long-time 
frame. As consequence, programs or activities relevance were less responsive to the 
current problem and the available opportunities. Therefore, it lacked of program 
consistency and synchronization vertically and horizontally.  
 
Table 7 and 8 provided a summary of two ways ANOVA test for 14 accounts of direct 
expenditure budget and 75 accounts of indirect expenditure budget during eight 
semesters. Generally, both tests supported the hypotheses that there were slacks 
between targeted budget and its realization for each account of indirect and direct 
expenditure budget. F-statistics values were bigger than F-table values with confidence 
level 5%, 2.027 and 1.313, respectively. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Two Ways ANOVA Test of Inter-Semester and Inter-Accounts 





F-statistics (1) F-statistics (2) 
Definition A 35.2730 4.0900 There are significantly budgetary 
slacks of inter-semester and inter-
accounts budget in each year. 
Definition B 94.6333 9.0303 There are significantly budgetary 
slacks of inter-semester and inter-
accounts budget in each year. 
F-table (5%; 7; 518) = 2.027 
F-table (5%; 74; 518) = 1.313 
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Table 8: Summary of Two Ways ANOVA Test of Inter-Semester and Inter-Accounts 





F-statistics (1) F-statistics (2) 
Definition A 154.9875 3.0717 There are significantly budgetary 
slacks of inter-semester and inter-
accounts budget in each year. 
Definition B 104.3178 1.6862 There are significantly budgetary 
slacks of inter-semester and inter-
accounts budget in each year. 
F-table (5%; 7; 518) = 2.027 
F-table (5%; 74; 518) = 1.313 
 
These empirical findings indicated that each department in local government determined 
and set the budget with its own perspectives and objectives. It meant that there programs 
were overlapping each other and even, crossed-eliminating.  Based on direct observation, 
the program progress report still tended to focus just on fund spending report, or in other 
words, there was no clear integration between financial report and performance report, as 
expected in Government Regulation No. 8 (2006).  
 
In context of report, perfomance indicator specification and performance target are still 
weak, even in some cases, the setting of expenditure amount is not based on performance 
target or results. This kind of settings has caused output volume relatively changes rapidly, 
while total expenditure is still the same. There some accounts in budget are not clear its 
performance indicators, such as General Administration Expenditure and Operational and 
Maintenance Expenditure. Generally, the weakness of local government financial 
management is indicated by the delaying of local public finance announcement and its 
revision often happens at the end of budget year. 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Based on paired mean difference test and two ways ANOVA test, there are significantly 
budgetary slacks of inter-semester and inter-accounts budget. It means that comparative 
theory does not apply in case of Indonesian local governance. In Indonesia, less-
developed provinces tend to estimate the revenue as high as possible, meanwhile 
determine expenditure budget lower than normal. It is done just to get ―positive perception‖ 
from central government and is deliberately done to find political advantage and far away 
from the entrepreneurial spirit. Unfortunately, developed provinces, such as Special 
Province of Jakarta, also do this kind of behaviors. It reflects that local government does 
not have any important characteristics to be an entrepreneur in managing its region or 
people, such as innovative and creative ideas to manage the risk of budgetary slacks. 
 
Special Province of Jakarta could study from Visalia, California, a prototypical American 
community, which had adopted successfully a radically new budget system (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992). It allowed manager to respond quickly as circumstances changed. Called 
the Expenditure Control Budget, it made two simple changes. First, it eliminated all line 
items within departmental budgets—freeing managers to move resources around as 
needs shifted. Second, it allowed departments to keep what they did not spend from one 
year to the next, so they could shift unused funds to new priorities. 
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However, this paper has main limitation, due to its study of ex post aspect and not taking 
ex ante aspect. This study could not provide any information related to factors influencing 
of public expenditure budgeting process, which are main variables of ex ante aspects, 
such as central government policies on national budget allocation to provinces and political 
behaviour of ruling governors. Further studies in this topic are still open, especially with 
observation spectrum on monthly basis and by taking consideration of liquidity factor as 
the determinant of budgetary slacks, because facts reveal that budget realization is far 
away from targeted budget due to the unavailable fresh fund when it is needed. By taking 
data before the period of 2004, further studies could make a comparison of the pre and 
post period of new public management program, whether the program really has given a 
significant improvement or not. 
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